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DIPLOMACY, CONDITIONALITY AND TRANSNATIONAL LGBTI RIGHTS1 
INTRODUCTION 
LGBTI2 rights have an increasingly transnational character.  This transnationalism has a significant 
legal aspect, which is particularly evident in the increased recognition of SOGI (sexual orientation and 
gender identity) at the United Nations and other international legal institutions.3   These legal 
developments are embedded within a body of political, diplomatic and financial action that helps to 
shape the parameters and vocabularies through which LGBTI rights are advanced.  This means that the 
operation of law and LGBTI rights within transnational spaces cannot be understood without also 
addressing the non- and quasi- legal actors that press for legal change. The primary focus of this chapter 
is therefore the legal effects of diplomatic and financial pressure for LGBTI rights.  In particular, it 
addresses the way that political strategies that rely on dichotomized approaches to transnational LGBTI 
rights can have lasting and problematic legal consequences.   
The chapter is divided into three parts.  Part One outlines recent critical approaches to transnational 
LGBTI rights, focusing on how transnational spaces tend towards overly dichotomous framings of 
SOGI issues.  Part Two examines three forms of transnational pressure for LGBTI rights - quiet 
diplomacy, public diplomacy and financial conditionalities.  Part Three demonstrates some of the 
complex and uneven effects of transnational pressure within domestic legal spaces by analysing how 
all of the forms of pressure from Part Two manifested in attempts to combat the Ugandan Anti-
Homosexuality Act 2014.  
 
PART ONE – THE DICHOTOMIZATION OF THE LGBTI RIGHTS DEBATE 
                                                          
1 'The research for this chapter was completed during a 2015-2018 Leverhulme Early Fellowship, 'International Relations 
and LGBTI Rights: Conditionality, Diplomacy and Activism' ECF-2015-612' 
2 This chapter refers to LGBTI, LGBT and LGB&T rights and groups. In using this terminology, I am guided by the sources 
and diplomatic literature cited in the chapter. It is important, however, to remain attentive to the way that the dynamics 
discussed in this chapter often obscure the different needs of different groups that might fall under the LGBTI umbrella. 
3 For a summary see ‘Learn More’ (UN Free and Equal) <https://www.unfe.org/learn-more/> Accessed 21 December 2017 
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Postcolonial queer analysis offers significant insight into symbolic and political meanings of LGBTI 
rights.  Most notable is the extent to which, as Puar argues, ‘“acceptance” and “tolerance” for gay and 
lesbian subjects have become a barometer by which the right to and capacity for national sovereignty 
is evaluated’.4 Legal recognition of (some forms of) queerness is thus leveraged into particular political 
goals and symbolic representations of national identity, maturity and progress.5 Thus, what Haritaworn, 
drawing upon Hobsbawn, has termed ‘invented traditions’ of ‘women-and-gay friendliness’ are 
operationalised towards the production and maintenance of national identity.6  
It is important to note that the political and symbolic goals into which SOGI is leveraged are not uniform 
from state to state or region to region. In Europe, for example, the imagination, or invented tradition, of 
Europe as LGBT-friendly has allowed for the alignment of European values of freedom and democracy 
with LGBT rights7. Yet equally, ‘political homophobia’ has been used to consolidate authority or power. 
This was the case in Russia in 2012, following the passage of a law regulating NGOs. 8  This ‘Foreign 
Agent Law’ requires the registration of any group that receives any foreign funding and engages in 
‘political activity’ in the course of its work.  The law has been used to target LGBTI groups (among 
others), and more generally, to increase state surveillance of groups that may be critical of Russian state 
policy. 9  In so doing, the law gives legal form to a common assumption – or invented tradition - found 
in a number of states that any identities or expressions that are not cis or heterosexual are foreign or 
alien.  
What is notable here is the extent to which the figure of the queer, homosexual, intersex or trans person 
is used in acts of boundary drawing, inclusion and exclusion. The refrain that ‘homosexuality is 
unAfrican’ is a familiar one to African queer and LGBTI activists and allies.10  Equally, in other parts 
                                                          
4 Jasbir K. Puar, 'Rethinking Homonationalism' (2013) 45 International Journal of Middle East Studies 336 
5 Cynthia Weber, Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge (Oxford University Press 
2016) 
6 Jin Haritaworn, Queer Lovers and Hateful Others: Regenerating Violent Times and Places (Pluto Press 2015) 
7 Phillip M. Ayoub and David Paternotte (eds), LGBT Actiism and the Making of Europe: A Rainbow Europe? (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2014) 
8 Federal Law of the Russian Federation of July 20, 2012 N. 121-FZ, “On Amendments to certain Legislative 
Acts of the Russian Federation with regard to regulating the activities of non-profit organizations that perform functions of a 
foreign agent” 
9 Melissa Hooper and Grigory Frolov ‘Russia’s Bad Example’ (Free Russia Foundation, Human Rights First, 2016) 
10 See Stella Nyanzi, 'Knowledge is Requisite Power: Making a Case for Queer African Scholarship' in Theo Sandfort and 
others (eds), Boldly Queer: African Perspectives on Same-Sex Sexuality and Gender Diversity (HIVOS 2015)  
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of the world, exclusionary actions or rhetoric have been directed towards perceived ‘homophobic’ 
others’, particularly at politically expedient moments.  Notably, the original text of the Executive Order 
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States11,  colloquially known as the 
‘Muslim ban’, states ‘the United States should not admit those who engage in acts of bigotry or 
hatred...for those who would oppress Americans of any race, gender, or sexual orientation’.12 This act 
of boundary drawing that excluded those perceived to be a threat to LGB individuals took place even 
while the Trump administration began reduce protections for LGB and particularly T Americans.13    
This boundary drawing contributes to what Weber has termed ‘sexualized orders of international 
relations’ that is: ‘international orders that are necessarily produced through various codings of sex, 
gender, and sexuality’14  The focus of this chapter is the role of diplomatic engagement with 
transnational discourses of SOGI and LGBTI rights in shaping these sexualised orders. This is 
particularly significant given Waites observation that these transnational debates have become ‘rather 
dichotomized’15, and dominated by binaries – including, but not limited to Global North/Global South, 
homosexual/heterosexual, progressive/traditional.  He has questioned how ‘situations of more subtle 
power relations’ can be represented beyond simple dichotomizations.16 In Waites analysis, there is 
identified a need to pay attention to ‘transnational linkages’, beyond essentialist mappings, in which the 
global and the local may interpenetrate, and how these interpenetrations are mediated by multiple other 
inequalities and positionalities. This is essentially a scalar and jurisdiction question that asks where and 
how rights and responsibilities are determined. Recent events have shown how the scale of the 
transnational plays a significant role in the determination of rights and responsibilities for SOGI 
communities, and therefore, the power relations, problematic assumptions and indeed, the ‘invented 
                                                          
11 Executive Order 13769 82 FR 8977 (2017) 
12 Ibid 
13 Megan McLemore ‘US Congress Should Protect Transgender Rights’ (Human Rights Watch, 22 October 2018)  
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/22/us-congress-should-protect-transgender-rights> Accessed 4 November 2018 
14 Cynthia Weber, 'Queer Intellectual Curiosity as International Relations Method: Developing Queer International Relations 
Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks ' (2016) 60 International Studies Quarterly 11 
15 Matthew Waites, ‘LGBTI Organisations Navigating Imperial Contexts’ (The Sociological Review Blog, 10 July 2017) 
<https://www.thesociologicalreview.com/blog/lgbti-organisations-navigating-imperial-contexts.html> Accessed 21 
December 2017 
16 Matthew Waites, 'LGBTI organizations navigating imperial contexts: the Kaleidoscope Trust, the Commonwealth and the 
need for a decolonizing, intersectional politics' (2017) 65 The Sociological Review 644, 647 
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traditions’ of transnational spaces, are significant when considering LGBTI rights, diplomacy and SOGI 
justice.  
 
PART TWO – TRANSNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC AND FINANCIAL APPROACHES TO 
ADVANCING LGBTI RIGHTS 
Traditional and Public Diplomacy 
Melissen draws a clear distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘public’ diplomacy:  
The basic distinction between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy is clear: the 
former is about relationships between the representatives of states, or other international 
actors; whereas the latter targets the general public in foreign societies and more specific 
non-official groups, organizations and individuals.17 
In advocating for LGBTI rights overseas, governments and activists have emphasised the importance 
of ‘quiet’ or traditional diplomacy.  The UK Foreign Office 2016 Human Rights Report notes, ‘LGB&T 
equality remains a sensitive subject for many countries and much of this diplomatic lobbying is carried 
out behind closed doors and is not reported on’.18  Quiet diplomatic action can include highlighting 
issues of SOGI with state authorities, either through private conversations or through the issuing of 
more formal diplomatic demarches in order to raise specific concerns.19 Alongside these lobbying 
activities, embassies have also worked to include LGBTI activists within their activities, providing 
meeting space, capacity building or networking opportunities.20   
Given the private nature of these communications, their effectiveness is difficult to quantify, beyond 
the observation that quiet diplomacy has often appeared to be the preferred strategy of in-country and 
                                                          
17 Jan Melissen, 'The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice' in Jan Melissen (ed), The New Public Diplomacy: 
Soft Power in International Relations (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 5 
18 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Human Rights and Democracy (Cmd 9487, 2017) 6 
19 ‘Diplomacy and Donor Relations Overseas’ (Sexuality and Social Justice: A Toolkit)  <http://spl.ids.ac.uk/sexuality-and-
social-justice-toolkit/3-what-you-can-do/diplomacy-and-donor-relations-overseas > Accessed 21 December 2017 
20 Ibid  
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grassroots activists.21 Transnational pressure for LGBTI rights is delicate and contentious, with a high 
risk of backlash.  Even quiet support can lead to accusations of foreign embassies promoting a ‘gay 
agenda’.22 Such accusations further exacerbate the tenuous position of SOGI minorities and reinforce 
simplistic framings of SOGI as an issue of the Global South versus the Global North. 
The political and cultural sensitivity of SOGI and the possibility of backlash demonstrates why 
‘lobbying behind closed doors’ is often a preferred strategy of activists and diplomats: more overt 
pressure risks exacerbating already-existing tensions.  Yet the question of who speaks, how and when, 
remains a challenge. De Vos has criticized the South African government for its reliance on quiet 
LGBTI diplomacy.  He points out that South African quiet diplomacy in countries such as Nigeria and 
Uganda must have been a ‘spectacular failure’ as both states passed repressive laws.23  Even within 
quiet diplomacy therefore, there is a set of scalar and spatial imaginaries of inside/outside, 
internal/external that mediate questions of power, influence and motive.   
These concerns are even more evident in public diplomatic action in which political and foreign policy 
concerns are often particularly pertinent in decisions to engage with issues of SOGI.  This public aspect 
of diplomacy has grown significantly in recent years, with a strong focus on building relationships and 
facilitating networks between different governmental and non-governmental partners.24 Public 
diplomacy thus engages a very different audience to that of private diplomacy may seek to project 
particular images or political agendas.25 Indeed, in some cases, public diplomatic responses to human 
rights violations overseas may be as much a response to a state feeling pressure from its own citizens 
to respond, as an effort to help those whose rights have been abused.26  
                                                          
21 Ibid 
22 Eg  GhanaWeb, '‘Foreign embassy behind agenda to legalise homosexuality in Ghana - NDC MP’' (GhanaWeb, 29 
November 2017) <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Foreign-embassy-behind-agenda-to-legalise-
homosexuality-in-Ghana-NDC-MP-605218#> accessed 21 December 2017; Aeyal Gross, 'Homoglobalism: The emergence 
of global gay governance' in Dianne Otto (ed), Queering International Law: Possibilities, Alliances, Complicities, Risks 
(Routledge 2017) 156  
23 Pierre de Vos, ‘Uganda: why quiet diplomacy is a devastating betrayal of gay men and lesbians on the continent’ (Daily 
Maverick, 4 March 2014) <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2014-03-04-uganda-why-quiet-diplomacy-is-a-
devastating-betrayal-of-gay-men-and-lesbians-on-the-continent/#.WjwKJk27JeV> Accessed 21 December 2017 
24 Melissen, 'The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice' 22 
25 Rachel  Bergenfield and Alice Miller, 'Queering International Development? An Examination of New 'LGBT Rights' 
Rhetoric, Policy, and Programming among International Development Agencies ' (2014) March 2014 LGBTQ Policy Journa  
26 Amar Wahab, 'Homosexuality/Homophobia is Un-African?: Un-Mapping Transnational Discourses in the Context of 
Uganda's Anti-Homosexuality Bill/Act' (2016) 63 Journal of Homosexuality 685 
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In short, public diplomacy becomes a kind of national branding. This branding may link closely with 
the ‘invented traditions’ and national imaginaries discussed above, but it is also tied to questions of 
power and politics – meaning that national imaginaries will be deployed in the most strategically 
valuable way.  This makes public diplomatic language and underlying structural assumptions upon 
which this language rests particularly significant. In this regard, modern public diplomacy for LGBTI 
rights has often used languages of ‘progress’:  
We have made great progress in protecting gender and sexual minorities. By continuing to 
promote human rights overseas and sharing our march towards equality with other 
countries, we can continue to encourage other countries to live up to their international 
human rights obligations.27 
This language allows the creation of a spatio-temporal contrast between those states which have already 
made progress and those who have yet to advance.  LGBTI rights align with a specific vision of how a 
‘modern’ state should act and a specific understanding of where that progressive state is most likely to 
be found in the world. 28  Consequently, the ‘branding’ of states as LGBTI friendly can often rest on the 
demarcation of other states as intolerant or backwards.  Thus, on a very public stage, problematic 
imaginaries that dichotomise Global North and Global South are reproduced and embedded in political 
discourse.  
In this way, public diplomatic support for LGBTI rights can become a form of pinkwashing, in which 
LGBTI rights can be integrated into diplomatic messaging where a state emphasises modern brand and 
identity, and diverts attention from its less progressive actions. This simultaneously ties LGBTI or queer 
liberation closely to state power by allowing the state and legal authorities to dictate the – often narrow 
and legally defined – parameters through which SOGI justice is seen to progress.29 Rights become the 
main – or even the only – form through which SOGI justice can come to be known.30  
                                                          
27 Victor Garcia-Rivera, ‘Promoting LGBTI Rights Overseas’ (Dipnote, June 9 2015) <http://2007-2017-
blogs.state.gov/stories/2015/06/09/promoting-lgbti-rights-overseas.html> Accessed 21 December 2017. 
28 Weber, Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge  
29 Katherine Franke, 'Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning Gay Rights' (2012) 44 Colum.Hum.Rts.L.Rev., 46 
30 Ibid 
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Public diplomacy as national branding thus encompasses a set of underpinning assumptions about 
which publics a state needs to engage with or placate, and a set of assumptions about how the state, law 
and political action should work to protect SOGI individuals.  The problem here is the narrowness of 
these assumptions – they take on a universal character when they are in fact limited patterns of action, 
norms and law. This does little to undermine the dichotomised relations identified by Waites above, 
and may in fact exacerbate these tensions. Indeed, Wahab has discussed the phenomenon of 
‘countermobilisation’ in which different ‘sides’ of a debate ramp up actions for or against SOGI rights 
in response to each other.31  This can lead to situations in which even quiet diplomacy, or more nuanced 
approaches to public diplomacy, are enfolded into already existing transnational narratives of identity, 
invented traditions, belonging and law.  
Indeed these patterns of action and reaction become a kind of governance: in which, ‘LGBT advocacy 
and ideas get incorporated into state, state-like and state-affiliated power'32. Gross has termed this 
‘Global Gay Governance’ and his analysis of this phenomenon traces how ‘LGBT advocates and ideas 
– and sometimes people – in governance itself’.33  In the context of public diplomacy, these forms of 
governance have often manifested through a language of ‘partnership’:  
I want to emphasize how much we are a part of a global movement - we as the United 
States are one player, amongst many. We recognize that our efforts must be guided by the 
work of civil society organizations that push for social change in their own contexts.34 
Potential partners are not just local groups and organisations – they can include other governments, civil 
society and religious groups, NGOs and INGOs, international organisations and increasingly, 
businesses and multinational corporations.35   
                                                          
31 Wahab, 'Homosexuality/Homophobia is Un-African?: Un-Mapping Transnational Discourses in the Context of Uganda's 
Anti-Homosexuality Bill/Act' 
32 Gross, 'Homoglobalism: The emergence of global gay governance' 
33 Ibid 151. 
34 Randy Berry,  ‘A Year in Review: Advancing the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons Globally’ (Dipnote, April 20 2016) 
<http://2007-2017-blogs.state.gov/stories/2016/04/20/year-review-advancing-human-rights-lgbti-persons-globally.html> 
Accessed 21 December 2017 
35 For an example of the US approach to these partnerships during the Obama administration see The White House, ‘FACT 
SHEET: Promoting and Protecting the Human Rights of LGBT Persons: A United States Government Priority’ (May 16 2015) 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/16/fact-sheet-promoting-and-protecting-human-rights-lgbt-
persons-united-sta> Accessed 21 December 2017 
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However partnerships are not necessarily a panacea for securing SOGI justice. Research on partnerships 
within the NGO sector has identified problems with powerful, usually Western, partners and donors 
dominating and dictating frameworks for action, or ignoring the ‘diverse histories, fractures, fluidity, 
and nodes of action’ that make up and mediate different communities.36 Language barriers and 
particular developmental ‘buzzwords’ can inhibit successful communication.37   
This does not mean that all partnerships are problematic, but it does suggest that partnerships themselves 
can be integrated into forms of diplomatic branding, and that they are not free from the political and 
foreign policy concerns that influence all other forms of diplomatic action. Certainly, for the purposes 
of this chapter, the emphasis on partnership also demonstrates the way in which a simple dichotomy of 
Global North/Global South cannot really capture the complexity of transnational organising for SOGI 
justice – there are multiple interconnections between the transnational, local and domestic.  Partnerships 
demonstrate how civil society actors can be active participants in transnational discourses.38  As Rao 
notes, in India, ‘international institutions are pushing against something of an open door, collaborating 
with local actors in co-producing activist narratives and interpellating subjectivities that already enjoy 
considerable social even if not state recognition.’39 Similarly, NGOs in Europe such as ILGA were able 
to use the ‘idea of Europe’ to frame LGBT issues as a European norm during the EU expansion period.40 
As in India, NGOs and other activists were not passive recipients of European diplomatic and legal 
largesse, but active participants in the shaping of transnational discourses and norms. 
Somewhat ironically therefore, the practices of transnational activism both trouble and reinforce notions 
of dichotomised discourses of LGBT rights.  Forms of activism cross facilitate transnational, domestic 
and local connections , but can also reinforce structures of global gay governance, which are limited at 
                                                          
36 Bergenfield and Miller, 'Queering International Development? An Examination of New 'LGBT Rights' Rhetoric, Policy, 
and Programming among International Development Agencies 'Angela Maria Crack, 'Language, listening and learning: 
critically reflective accountability for INGOs' (2013) 79 International Review of Administrative Sciences 809 
37 Wine Tesseur, 'Listening, languages and the nature of knowledge and evidence: what we can learn from investigating 
‘listening’ in NGOs' in Robert Gibb, Annabel Tremlett and Julien  Danero Iglesias (eds), Learning and Using Languages in 
Ethnographic Research, (Multilingual Matters 2017) 
38 Chaitanya Lakkimsetti, '“Empowered Criminals and Global Subjects”: Transnational Norms and Sexual Minorities in India' 
(2016) 39 Qualitative Sociology 375; Lynnette J. Chua, Chua LJ, 'The Vernacular Mobilization of Human Rights in Myanmar's 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Movement' (2015) 49 L.& Soc.Rev 299; See also the case of Sexual Minorities Uganda 
v Scott Lively Civil Action 3:12-CV-30051 (MAP) (US District Court for the District of Massachusetts) 
39 Rahul Rao, 'Global homocapitalism' (2015) 194 Radical Philosophy. 38  
40 Ayoub and Paternotte (eds), LGBT Actiism and the Making of Europe: A Rainbow Europe  
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best and dichotomising at worst. In the European context, for example, Ayoub and Patternotte 
emphasise the extent to which transnational organising has helped to create a hierarchy of LGBT NGOs 
in which those activists best able to engage with transnational donors and networks – through the ability 
to speak English, technology, or even youth – tend to be most successful.41 The danger here is that 
localised power relations and exclusions, be they along the lines of race, class, gender or other 
dynamics, will be reproduced with respect to those who are able to access transnational discourses and 
engage with structures of diplomacy and governance, that are themselves underpinned by the 
dichotomised language of ‘progress’.    
Financial Support and Foreign Aid 
Increasingly, financial and developmental agendas have played a role in transnational LGBTI rights.  
Diplomacy here becomes a matter of commercial practice, financial support and punitive 
conditionalities. Coalitions of governments, businesses, NGOs and foundations have made significant 
financial contributions to LGBTI activists both individually and in coalition.42  
Resource provision is part of a larger cluster of economic actions for LGBTI rights. The ‘business case’ 
for LGBTI rights is increasingly emphasised in different international forums, including a recent 
European Commission Report43 and through the official inclusion of LGBTI issues at the World 
Economic Forum in 2016.44  As Rao notes, ‘temples of global capitalism have become increasingly 
vociferous of late in their opposition to homophobia,’45 apparently motivated by a recognition of the 
productivity of inclusive workplaces and a sensitivity to potential consumer backlash against companies 
perceived to be homophobic.46   
                                                          
41 Ibid 15 
42 Global Equality Fund,  ‘Promoting and Protecting the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons around the World’ Annual Report 
(2015); Kretz Adam J, 'Aid Conditionality as (Partial) Answer to Antigay Legislation: An Analysis of British and American 
Foreign Aid Policies Designed to Protect Sexual Minorities' (2013) 7 Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law 
43 Lisa van Beek, Alessandra Cancedda, Carlien Scheele ‘The Business Case for Diversity in the Workplace: sexual orientation 
and gender identity Report on good practices’ (2016, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission)   
44 HRC, 'HRC Heads to Davos to Amplify LGBTQ Rights at World Economic Forum' (Human Rights Campaign, 22 January 
2018) <https://www.hrc.org/blog/hrc-heads-to-davos-to-amplify-lgbtq-rights-at-world-economic-forum> Accessed 22, 
November 2019) 
45 Rahul Rao, 'Global homocapitalism'.38  
46 Beek, Cancedda and Scheele ‘The Business Case for Diversity in the Workplace: sexual orientation and gender identity 
Report on good practices’  
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Activists and international organisations have been quick to appeal to these sensitivities.47 The UN has 
developed standards of conduct for businesses in tackling LGBTI discrimination.48 The World Bank 
has undertaken research into the economic costs of homophobia, and in 2016, appointed an advisor on 
SOGI issues.49 Increasingly, states and international institutions have been willing to support these 
normative developments with financial penalties, including a somewhat sporadic willingness to 
withdraw or re-direct financial aid money in the wake of the passage of discriminatory laws.  The most 
well-known recent example of this is the re-direction of aid to Uganda following the passage of the 
Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014, which is discussed below.   
Arguments for the protection of LGBTI rights have therefore expanded beyond questions of law. Just 
as diplomatic or political progress is associated with LGBTI rights protection, so too, economic progress 
is associated with the inclusion of SOGI minorities.  Rao calls this ‘global homocapitalism’, that is, ‘the 
selective incorporation of some race-, class- and gender-sanitized queers into capitalism’.50  What is 
notable here is the way in which economic forces re-inscribe the same dimensions of progress – 
narrowly and neoliberally defined – as are found in the diplomatic arguments discussed above.  States 
and organisations that have made progress, exert financial and political pressure on those who have yet 
to advance.  And as with all of the examples discussed in this chapter, non-legal forms of pressure and 
discourse intermingle with legal structures and norms.   
There is a significant danger here that as powerful actors in transnational legal and diplomatic networks 
engage in acts of incorporation and branding, they further dichotomise the transitional terrain.  A state 
that uses LGBTI rights to advertise its ‘modern’ credentials, or an International Financial Institution 
(IFI) that emphasises the power of economic progress to bring about SOGI justice is, in part, 
communicating with a target audience – be that particular publics, shareholders, or those holding 
                                                          
47 See Randy Berry, ‘Remarks: Global State of the Movement’ (March 23 2016) <https://2009-
2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2016/255012.htm> Accessed 21 December 2017 
48 Salil Tripathi, Charles Radcliffe, Fabrice Houdart, Tackling Discrimination against Lesbian, Gay, Bi, Trans, & Intersex 
People: Standards of Conduct for Business  (UN OHCHR, 2017) 
49 M. V. Lee Badgett, The Economic Cost of Stigma and the Exclusion of LGBT People: A Case Study of India, 2014);  World 
Bank, ‘World Bank Announces New Advisor on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Issues (27 October 2016) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/10/27/world-bank-announces-new-advisor-on-sexual-orientation-
and-gender-identity-issues> Accessed 21 December 2017 
50 Rao, 'Global homocapitalism'. 47 
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positions of power.   The danger of these kinds of national and transnational branding is that it reinforces 
problematic trends within transnational terrains: a ‘modern’ state requires a backwards other against 
which it can define itself.  Such framings do little to address underlying power structures of international 
law, or the multidimensionality of SOGI justice.  One example of this multidimensionality is addressed 
below.  
PART THREE – PROBLEMATISING IMAGINARIES OF THE TRANSNATIONAL AND 
THE DOMESTIC 
The focus of this chapter is the operation of transnational quasi- and non-legal dynamics of diplomacy 
and conditionality.  This final section of the paper traces one example of a situation in which the multiple 
forms of transnational pressure described above manifested in response to domestic legislation – the 
Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014 (AHA).  The AHA is not the only example of repressive 
legislation targeting LGBTI individuals in recent years, but it did attract significant attention. 51 The 
intention here is not to imply that this is a case that is representative of all transnational responses to 
LGBTI rights violations, instead it is one possible outline of the complexities that can arise during the 
course of such responses.  
Homosexuality was already illegal in Uganda under s145 of the Ugandan Penal Code, which was first 
introduced by the British Empire.52  The Anti-Homosexuality Bill (AHB), which was tabled in 2009, 
represented a significant increase in criminal penalties for homosexuality, originally including the death 
penalty for ‘aggravated homosexuality’ and introducing stringent restrictions on LGBTI organising.  
The AHB was very popular in Uganda and was repeatedly leveraged by Ugandan politicians to distract 
from scandals and corruption, and to secure political authority.53  It was strongly opposed by coalitions 
of transnational activists, politicians and publics.54 Despite international condemnation, and domestic 
                                                          
51 See Adrian Jjuuko, 'International Solidarity and its Role in the Fight Against Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Bill' in Kay 
Lalor and others (eds), Gender, Sexuality and Social Justice: What's law got to do with it? (Institute of Development Studies 
2016) for a discussion of why Uganda may have become a flashpoint. 
52 Adrian Jjuuko and Fridah Mutesi, 'The multifaceted struggle against the Anti-Homosexuality Act in Uganda' in Nancy 
Nicol and others (eds), Envisioning Global LGBT Human Rights: (Neo)colonialism, Neoliberalism, Resistance and Hope 
(Institute of Commonwealth Studies 2018) 279 
53 Ibid 275 
54 Jjuuko, 'International Solidarity and its Role in the Fight Against Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Bill' Wahab,  
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rhetoric of the un-Africanness of homosexuality, we cannot understand the AHB or AHA as an example 
of a simplistic transnational dichotomy.  Indeed as Nyanzi and Karamagi note:  
 The question of foreignness within the debate on homosexuality in Uganda is paradoxical 
because both anti-gay and pro-gay camps partnered with foreign allies sympathetic to their 
divergent causes.55 
There is evidence of these pro- and anti-gay partnerships throughout the life of the AHB and AHA.  
Ugandan activists fighting the legislation consulted with international transnational allies and worked 
hard to managed the transnational support that they received.56  Equally, a US pastor, Scott Lively, was 
sued in the US under the Alien Tort Statue by Ugandan activists for his anti-gay activism in Uganda.57  
The case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, but the ruling affirmed that Lively’s actions against 
LGBTI people would constitute persecution under international law.  The very existence of this case, 
in which a Ugandan group sued a US citizen in a court in Massachusetts for actions that violated 
international law, demonstrates the complex entanglements of different jurisdictions and different 
imaginaries of global, domestic and local that animated discussions of the AHA. 
Thus to view the AHA as a manifestation of foreign vs. domestic, Global North vs. Global South is too 
simplistic.  Importantly, it also denies the agency of Ugandan activists who, in pursuing a ‘multi-
pronged strategy’58 to fight the AHA, were deeply sensitive to transnational currents, which they 
managed with considerable skill.   
These transnational currents were significant – public and private diplomacy as well as financial 
conditionalities followed the AHB’s introduction.  The bill gained significant international media 
attention and was the subject of online petitions which targeted the Ugandan government as well as 
multinational financial corporations that operated in Uganda.59  Ambassadors and influential figures 
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engaged in both quiet and public diplomacy to attempt to sway Ugandan politicians against the AHB 
as it passed through parliament.60  In 2014, after President Museveni signed the AHA into law, a number 
of states, including Sweden, Denmark, Norway and the US withdrew or otherwise re-directed aid 
money.61  The World Bank also delayed and then dropped a US $90 million loan that had been intended 
to support maternal healthcare, reportedly with input from members of the US Congress (the US is the 
largest shareholder in the World Bank).62   
Alongside these public actions, some states eschewed imposing financial conditionalities, fearing that 
such gestures would invite backlash.63 And while the World Bank’s withdrawal of the loan was 
dramatic, it later funded a project that provided vouchers for maternal healthcare.64   The US withdrawal 
of financial aid restricted and redirected some funds, but it continued to deploy US Airforce personnel 
and planes within Uganda to support African Union actions against the Lord’s Resistance Army.65  
These apparently contradictory actions were justified through a unifying logic of protecting human 
rights: ‘Ensuring justice and accountability for human rights violators like the LRA and protecting 
LGBT rights aren’t mutually exclusive. We can and must do both.’66  
The response to the AHA demonstrates the extent to which states, IFIs and advocacy coalitions seek to 
participate in the shaping of legal norms and legal actions in places where they have no jurisdiction.  
Yet the legal effect of this pressure is difficult to trace: the AHA was annulled by the Ugandan 
Constitutional Court, but the decision Oloka-Onyango & 9 Others v Attorney-General67 was narrowly 
decided, with the Court nullifying the AHA on the basis of lack of quoracy when the AHB was passed.68  
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It could be reasonably assumed that the Court was walking a careful line here – the issue of quoracy 
provided a convenient way to sidestep transnational outrage and domestic enthusiasm for the AHA. 
This is not to say that international pressure was meaningless: the expedited hearing of the case - three 
months ahead of schedule - may have been arranged to ensure that President Museveni could avoid 
diplomatic embarrassment during the US-Africa Leaders Summit in August 2014.69  As Jjuuko notes, 
‘No other petition had been heard so quickly since the court’s formation in 2005.  The court did not 
state what prompted them to decide the case in such record time, and so the real reason is subject to 
speculation, but it was quite clear that political forces beyond the judicial process were also at play.’70  
Following the nullification of the AHA, President Museveni warned parliament that passing a similar 
Bill would discourage international investment and was thus bad for Uganda.71   
While the Oloka-Onyango judgment ‘allowed for a collective sigh of relief among the LGBTI 
community and their allies’72, its legacy is complex.  As Khanna comments, ‘The Bill, in other words, 
already had a social and political life even while it did not, strictly speaking, have the legal status as 
law in force.’73 This social and political life meant that NGOs, activists and LGBTI Ugandans have 
faced increased harassment from public authorities and private actors.74 An important parallel should 
be highlighted here: just as the transnational life of LGBTI rights does not always require law to be in 
force, so much as actors and institutions acting as if a set of actions and policies have legal status, so 
too in Uganda did the potential presence of the AHA inculcate particular forms of action in which the 
many in the police and elsewhere, acted as if AHB had already passed.  In both cases, what is at stake 
here is not so much a question of a single law, but how norms, assumptions an imaginaries within which 
those laws are embedded allow for the operation of power.75  
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It is for this reason that it is important to pay attention to transnational narratives and dynamics of 
LGBTI diplomacy and conditionality. The effects of these pressures were not negligible, but they were 
not always clear, or easy to classify according to a singular, dichotomous ordering of international 
relations. They indicate the extent to which ‘invented traditions’ and national narratives of identity and 
sovereignty – be they of Western queer-friendliness or homosexuality as un-African – can influence 
political debates, with legal implications.  In the recent case of Nabagesera Jacqueline Kasha 
Nabagesera & 3 Others v Attorney-General & Another76, these traditions have found further legal form.  
Nabagesera followed Minister of Ethics, Simon Lokodo’s closure of a workshop organised by the group 
Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG).  The organisers sued, arguing that the closure of the workshop was 
an unjustified interference with constitutionally protected rights of association and expression.  They 
lost on all counts, and the judge chastised the applicants for their reliance on European case law in their 
submissions:     
… Uganda and Europe have different laws and moral values and accordingly define their 
public interests differently…Therefore its precedents are not binding but must be read in 
a manner consistent with Ugandan laws and norms.77  
In this estimation, Uganda and Europe are different, static and fixed as opposites.  Here, the 
dichotomous divide that underpins much transnational diplomatic language of LGBTI rights takes on a 
vital, and problematic, force.  
 
CONCLUSION – DIPLOMACY, ACTIVISM AND FINANCIAL AID FOR LGBTI RIGHTS: A 
DOUBLE EDGED SWORD  
The presence of LGBTI rights within diplomatic and transnational discourse is not without risk on 
various fronts: of backlash, of unintended consequences, of transnational or diplomatic supporters 
acting in ways that conflict with the best interests of those on the ground.   Moreover, within the 
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dichotomised and rights focused framework outlined in this chapter, there is a risk that transnational 
narratives may move elsewhere following ‘victories’ such as the nullification of the AHA, leaving 
newly visible communities vulnerable.78  This does not mean that activists are mute or powerless in the 
face of changing transnational power relations, but it does demonstrate clearly the ‘double edged sword’ 
of international solidarity79: international support can be a powerful weapon; but it is complex, and it 
can be dangerous when it reinforces the problematic patterns discussed in this chapter.  The challenge 
is to push back against this cycle and recognise the multifaceted complexity of relationships that exist 
within transnational spaces and relationships of SOGI activism. 
We might conclude then, by quoting from a recent UK House of Commons debate:  
This is a tale of two worlds. In one we have seen the near completion of rights for LGBT 
people.  In a 16-year period, 25 countries around the world have passed same-sex marriage 
legislation, while others have passed legislation recognising civil partnerships…There is 
another world, too. I am talking about a world in which 75 countries criminalise same-sex 
activity between consenting adults.80 
The error here is not the desire to respond to the unjust treatment of SOGI minorities.  It is the 
perspective that frames this response as a matter of just two worlds and envisages a teleological path 
from one world to the other, guided by the goal of the ‘completion of rights for LGBT people’81.  The 
vastness of human sexuality, gender and culture requires a great deal more than this.  A simple division 
of the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ with regard to SOGI justice will never be sufficient. The challenge is 
instead to locate other worlds, paths and voices in order to challenge and upset the problematic 
dichotomies that are increasingly being essentialized in law.  
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